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Abstract. This paper explores the emergence of norms in agents’ soci-
eties when agents play multiple -even incompatible- roles in their social
contexts simultaneously, and have limited interaction ranges. Specifically,
this article proposes two reinforcement learning methods for agents to
compute agreements on strategies for using common resources to per-
form joint tasks. The computation of norms by considering agents’ play-
ing multiple roles in their social contexts has not been studied before.
To make the problem even more realistic for open societies, we do not
assume that agents share knowledge on their common resources. So, they
have to compute semantic agreements towards performing their joint ac-
tions.
1 Introduction
It is well known that effective norms, policies or conventions can significantly
enhance the performance of agents acting in groups and societies, since they do
enable a kind of social control to the behavior of agents, without compromising
their autonomy [1]. The emergence or learning of norms in agents’ societies is
a major challenge, given that societies are open, agents may not be qualified to
collaborate effectively under previously unseen conditions, or they may need to
compute effective rules of behavior very efficiently, w.r.t. their preferences and
constraints.
There are several models that have been proposed for computing agreed and
emerging norms / conventions via learning from agents’ interaction experiences.
The research question is when and how agents converge to agreed norms or
conventions, in cases there are multiple strategies yielding the same optimal
payoff. In this article we consider norms as social conventions (i.e. as set of
agreed, stipulated, or generally accepted standards or criteria) rather than as
deontic aspects (e.g. obligations, prohibitions or permissions).The main question
that this article aims to answer is ”how effectively do norms emerge in a society
via establishing agreements in social contexts through local interactions and with
limited information about others knowledge, preferences and choices?”.
To frame the existing computational models towards the emergence of norms,
as pointed out in [2], these may be categorized to imitation, normative advise,
machine learning and data-mining models. In this paper we propose reinforce-
ment learning approaches to computing norms. Previous studies (e.g. [3], [4],
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2[5]), have shown that Q-learners are more efficient than other learners using for
instance WoLF [6], Fictitious Play [7], Highest Cumulative Reward -based [8]
models. In this article we aim beyond the reported facts towards showing how
agents mutually learn in a distributed and efficient way strategies that maxi-
mize their payoff w.r.t. some preferences and constraints, via local interactions,
while playing multiple and maybe roles with incompatible preferences. Towards
this target, this article reports on social learning models where agents via com-
munication do form specific expectations for the behavior of others. They do
this in their social contexts, ensuring local interactions: Agents exchange their
computed strategies, and compute the best strategy to follow, given the strate-
gies of others. Additionally, while some of the research works have considered
local agents’ interactions, and learning-by-doing via local interaction with mul-
tiple agents, this article emphasizes on the social context of agents. By doing
so, we formalize the learning process in cases where agents play multiple roles
simultaneously in their contexts and by interacting with acquaintances playing
different roles. The notion of agents’ social context allows distinguishing between
agreements of agents in their social context and society-wide norms. These, in
conjunction to relaxing the assumption that agents share a common represen-
tation of the world, clarify the contributions of this research work, compared
to the state of the art approaches for learning norms. Specifically, this article
proposes methods for agents to reach social conventions, by:
– Playing multiple roles and interacting with others that play multiple roles
simultaneously in their social contexts.
– Reconciling conflicting options while considering incompatibilities among
roles.
– Computing semantic correspondences between their representations of the
world: This article deals with strategies on using resources towards perform-
ing joint tasks. Although the article considers a specific type of resource
(time), this is not restrictive to the applicability of the methods proposed to
other type of resources are strategies.
Finally,
– Agents learn society norms (conventions) via computing agreements in their
social contexts.
We need to emphasize that agents’ semantic agreements (i.e. agreements on
the meaning of terms they use for the representation of resources) are put in the
context of their joint tasks: Tasks that need the coordinated action of at least
two agents. By doing so, agents are restricted to semantic agreements that do
”work in reality” effectively. Consider for instance the case where agents, due
to their limited knowledge of others’ representations reach agreements about
the meaning of symbols, which if put to a working context will lead either to
ineffectiveness, or to the inability to act.
Towards answering the main research question stated above, this article pro-
poses two social learning reinforcement learning methods. Both methods exploit
3(a) agents’ preferences on the use of resources, (b) the feedback that agents re-
ceive for their strategies to use resources while interacting with others in their
social context, (c) their reward for performing role-specific actions for any role
they play w.r.t. their strategies for using resources. Although both methods are
social (i.e. they are based on agents’ local interactions), in one of them agents
do not consider their joint decisions and do not share rewards, while in the other
they learn collaboratively by acting and receiving rewards/sanctions for their
joint strategies.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a motivating scenario.
Section 3 formulates the problem and section 4 presents the proposed methods.
Section 5 presents experimental results for agents societies of different size and
structure. Section 6 presents related works and finally, section 7 concludes the
article by summarizing the contributions made and presents interesting lines of
future research.
2 Motivating Scenario
Consider the following scenario: AgentX among other commitments in its work-
ing context is being involved in a recently-appointed team towards the design of
a new product. The team has a coordinator agent who has already many com-
mitments with other teams. Besides that, AgentX is committed to perform other
tasks as member of other groups independently from his working context. Role-
specific tasks that AgentX has to perform require resources whose use has to be
coordinated with others. Time is of primary importance here. Thus, to arrange
his schedule, AgentX considers different time periods for scheduling role-specific
tasks according to roles’ preferences (e.g. due to conventional arrangements).
He tries to keep concerns separate, while complying with his commitments and
obligations and coordinating with others effectively.
The social context of AgentX is the set of roles to which the agent interacts,
including also own roles. The agents with whom he interacts may also play
multiple roles, and they constitute AgentX’s neighborhood.
Consider for instance two daily periods that AgentX names P1 and P2. Given
a role R that AgentX plays, these periods may be ordered according to a measure
of preference: Let that be γ(R, ·). Let for instance P1 be more preferred than P2
from the point of view of role R. I.e. γ(R,P2) ≤ γ(R,P1). While AgentX’s col-
laborators may play other roles (different from R) they may not share AgentX’
representation of periods. Thus, AgentX has to agree with them on the meaning
of periods, to start coordinating with them. Consider for instance the periods X1
and X2 specified by the busy team coordinator. Agents, to begin coordinating
towards performing joint tasks (e.g. meeting), need to reach agreement to the
correspondences between the periods considered by the different roles 1. In this
1 Of course agents may specify periods using different time granularities, different
forms of representing time, etc. In this paper we assume that there is a specific gran-
ularity for specifying periods and thus agents just have to align their specifications:
Otherwise, further agreements are necessary.
4particular case there are clearly two possible options for reaching an agreement
on correspondences between periods. Nevertheless, there is at most one option
which is meaningful (i.e. it corresponds to the semantics of periods’ representa-
tions), but we do not assume this to be known to the agents. Let, for instance,
the meaningful correspondences be: (a) P1 is the same as X2 and (b) P2 is the
same as X1. Notice that agents may reach an agreement to non-meaningful cor-
respondences: In this case they will not be able to act jointly, receiving a very
low payoff for their joint task.
Notice that to reach an agreement to the correspondences between periods’
representations agents do not have to consider their preferences on periods for
scheduling tasks. Nevertheless, considering preferences, AgentX’s neighbors may
have the incentive of choosing AgentX’s non-preferable period for scheduling
their tasks. Such decisions can lead to undesirable situations and to ineffective-
ness in performing joint tasks. Consider for instance the busy team coordinator.
He/she may prefer X1 to schedule meetings with team members, while AgentX
-being a member of the team, prefers to schedule joint tasks in period P1. Given,
for instance, that P1 is the same as X2 and P2 is the same as X1, then, the pos-
sible choice of the team member to schedule a joint task is P1 (and X2), while
for the team coordinator is X1 (and P2): These possible choices do not satisfy
the preferences of both agents.
In addition to these, some of the roles may have incompatible requirements
and preferences to the use of resources. We define two roles to be incompati-
ble w.r.t. a resource (or simple incompatible, in case we consider time as the
only type of resources) if joint tasks for these roles cannot share the resource
when performed by a single agent (e.g. considering time periods, an agent must
schedule tasks for two incompatible roles in non-overlapping time periods).
Thus, summarizing the above, AgentX has to reach agreements with his
neighbors to schedule their joint tasks, so as to satisfy as much as possible his
preferences on scheduling tasks, and the constraints related to the incompatibil-
ity of roles: This is rather complicated given that AgentX plays multiple roles
and interacts with multiple others, while this is true for his acquaintances.
For a convention to evolve in the society, all agents in the population playing
the same roles have to agree on their strategies for using resources: E.g. pairs of
agents playing the roles of team members and team coordinators have to learn
one of the following policy pairs to schedule joint tasks: (a) (P1, X2), according
to the preference of the team member, or (b) (P2, X1), being in accordance to
the preferences of the coordinator.
This scenario emphasizes on the following aspects of the problem:
– Related to resources:
• Agents need to coordinate their use of resources to perform joint tasks
(in our scenario we consider time as the unique resource)
• Agents do not share a common representation of the resources, so they
have to agree on the semantics of their representations
• Agents’ preferences on the use of the resource vary for each of the roles
they are playing
5– Related to agents’ roles:
• Each agent may play and interact with multiple (even incompatible)
roles.
• Each agent has a social context, defined by its own roles and the roles
that it interacts with.
– Related to agreements and norms:
• Semantic agreements are put in the context of agents actions: In our
example it is clear that even if agents agree on correspondences between
periods, this may not lead them to schedule their tasks as effectively as
they may wish.
• Agents in their social context have to reach agreements on the use of
resources for performing their joint tasks.
• Norms are agreements that are widely accepted by all agents in the
society.
As far as we know, there is not any research work concerning the emergence
of conventions in agents’ societies that consider these aspects in combination.
As already said, the major question that this paper aims to answer is ”how
effectively do norms emerge in a society via establishing agreements in social
contexts through local interactions and with limited information about others’
representations, preferences and choices?”. The effectiveness of a model is mea-
sured by means of the percentage of role playing agents reaching agreement
on specific conventions, as well as by measuring the computational iterations
(epochs) necessary for a society to converge to conventions.
Towards answering this question, agents need to (a) compute semantic agree-
ments for the terms they use to represent resources, (b) use semantic agreements
to compute agreements on the use of resources for performing their joint tasks
in their social contexts w.r.t. their preferences on using resources and roles’ in-
compatibilities.
3 Problem Specification
A society of agents S = (R, A,E) is modeled as a graph with one vertex per
agent in A and any edge in E connecting pairs of agents. A connected pair
of agents must be coordinated to the use of resources for the performance of
role-specific tasks (e.g. to the scheduling of their tasks) and can communicate
directly to each other. Each agent i in the society is attributed with different roles
R = {R1, R2...}. The naming of roles is a social convention and thus, all agents
in the society use the same set of roles. N(i) denotes the neighborhood of agent
i, i.e. the set of agents connected to agent i, including also itself. Subsequently,
the fact that agent i plays the role Rj ∈ R, is denoted by i:j.
Each role Ri considers a set of time periods PRi = {P1, P2...} that are
ordered according to Ri’s preferences for scheduling role-specific tasks. Role-
specific periods in PRi are order by the preference of Ri, according to the func-
tion γ(Ri, ·) : PRi → R. Although we may consider any relation between periods
(e.g. they may be disjoint, overlapping etc), in this article we consider only equal
6(=) and mutually disjoint (<>, non-overlapping) time periods. Each role has its
own preferences to scheduling tasks in periods, while the naming of periods as
well as the pairs of incompatible roles is common knowledge to all agents that
play the same role.
Given a pair of roles (Ri, Rj), these may be incompatible w.r.t. a resource.
Considering time, agents interacting with incompatible roles cannot schedule
any pair of joint tasks, with each these roles, during the same time period. Any
pair of agents, or a single agent, may play incompatible roles.
Agents playing different roles do not possess any common knowledge, neither
exchange any information concerning the role-specific periods, their preferences
on scheduling tasks, or their payoffs for scheduling tasks in any period. Thus,
agents playing different roles may use different names for the same period, or the
same name for denoting different periods. No agent possesses global knowledge
on the semantics of role-specific representation of periods , and thus on corre-
spondences between periods names: We consider that this holds for any single
agent that plays multiple roles, as well.
At this point it must be emphasized that while this article considers time
periods, the formulation and the proposed methods can be applied to other
types of resources that can be treated similarly to time and are necessary to the
execution of role-specific tasks.
A social context for an agent i denoted by SocialContext(i), is the set of
roles played by the agents in its neighborhood. More formally:
SocialContext(i) = {Rk|∃j ∈ N(i) and j : k}.
It must be noticed that the social context of an agent i includes own roles,
denoted by Roles(i).
Agents in the society must decide on the scheduling of their (more interest-
ingly, joint) tasks so as to increase their effectiveness. More specifically, consid-
ering two acquaintances i:k and j:m, where j ∈ N(i), and a joint task for their
roles Rk and Rm, agents must schedule that task in an agreed period P , so as
to increase their expected payoff with respect to their role-specific preferences
on schedules. Considering that agents and their neighbors play multiple -maybe
incompatible- roles, they have also to take into account role-specific (incompat-
ible) requirements on scheduling tasks. Incompatibilities are formally specified
in section 3.
To agree on a specific period P for scheduling their joint task, agents i:k and
j:m have to first agree on correspondences between their representations of peri-
ods: Towards this we consider that agents can subjectively hold correspondences
between own representations of periods and representations of others: These may
be computed by each agent using own methods, and information about others’
roles. A subjective correspondence for the agent i:k and its acquaintance j:m is a
tuple 〈P, S〉, s.t. P ∈ PRk and S ∈ PRm2. Such a correspondence represents that
the agent i considers P and S to represent the same time interval. Nevertheless,
2 It must be pointed out that since the neighborhood of any agent includes itself, and
its social context includes its own roles, it may also hold that i = j.
7given that acquaintances may nor agree on their subjective correspondences,
they have to reach an agreed set of correspondences.
For norms to emerge in the society, any pair of agents (anywhere in the
society) playing roles Rk, Rm must reach the same decisions for scheduling joint
tasks for these roles.
Towards this goal, this article proposes two distributed social learning meth-
ods for agents to compute society-wide agreements via local interactions with
their neighbors.
4 Social Reinforcement Learning methods for computing
Agreements
To describe the proposed methods for the computation of norms, we distinguish
between two, actually highly intertwined, computation phases: (a) The compu-
tation of agent-specific, subjective correspondences on periods, and strategies
for scheduling tasks w.r.t. own preferences and constraints concerning incom-
patibility of roles; and (b) the computation of contextual agreements concerning
agents’ strategies to schedule joint tasks.
Computation of local correspondences and strategies: Given an agent
i playing a role Rk, and a role Rm ∈ SocialContext(i) played by a an agent
j in the neighborhood of i, agents need to compute subjective correspondences
between periods in PRk and PRm .
Although agents may use own methods to compute these correspondences,
these computations have to preserve the semantics of periods’ specifications: This
is done via validity constraints that coherent correspondences between periods
must satisfy. These constraints depend on the possible relations between periods.
Therefore, considering only equal and disjoint time periods, and given two dis-
tinct roles Rk and Rm, the validity constraints that correspondences computed
by i:k must satisfy are as follows:
– if 〈P,X〉 and 〈P ′, X ′〉 are correspondences with X,X ′ ∈ PRm , P, P ′ ∈ PRk and
P <> P ′, then it must hold that X <> X ′.
– if 〈P,X〉 and 〈P,X ′〉 are correspondences with X,X ′ ∈ PRm and P, P ′ ∈ PRk ,
then X = X ′.
Given these validity constraints, each agent can compute its own role-specific,
subjective, coherent correspondences between time periods. Given these corre-
spondences, any agent i:k has to make a specific decision for the period to sched-
ule joint tasks with any other agent playing the role Rm in its social context.
Let that decision be denoted by decision(i:k, ·:m) 3. Later on we specify how
agents reach these decisions and how they reach agreements on their subjective
correspondences.
Given that each agent may interact with multiple roles in its social context,
considering any pair of incompatible roles Rk, Rm, the following incompatibility
constraint holds:
3 the notation (·:m) means ”any agent playing the role Rm”
8– Given an agent i playing any role Rx, and given two incompatible roles Rk, Rm ∈
SocialContext(i), then
decision(i : x, ·:m) <> decision(i : x, ·:k).
Given the above validity and incompatibility constraints, the utility of an agent
i : k for choosing a period P ∈ PRk to schedule joint tasks with j : m, given the
subjective correspondence < P,X > between periods, is
U(i:k, P ) = γ(Rk, P ) + f(i:k, P ), where γ(Rk, P ) is the preference of role Rk to P , and
f(i:k, P ) = G(i:k) + C(i:k), where G(i:k) = Payoff ∗ SatisfiedConstraints(i:k) and
C(i:k) = Penalty ∗ V iolatedConstraints(i:k).
Payoff is a positive number representing the payoff of any satisfied con-
straint in the social context of agent i:k and Penalty is a negative number
that represents the cost of violating a validity or incompatibility constraint.
SatisfiedConstraints(i:k) (resp. V iolatedConstraints(i:k)) is the number of
satisfied (resp. violated) constraints for the agent i.
Computing contextual agreements: Given agents’ subjective correspon-
dences and own decisions for any role they play, these correspondences and
decisions may not agree with the choices of their neighbors. Towards reaching
agreements, also with respect to constraints and role-specific preferences, agents
consider the feedback received from their neighbors.
According to this communication-based learning approach, given an agent i
and two roles Rk ∈ Roles(i) and Rm ∈ SocialContext(i), to get feedback on de-
cisions, the agent i:k propagates its decision for scheduling joint tasks with agents
·:m in its neighborhood in period P , together with its subjective correspondence
〈P,X〉, where X ∈ PRm to all Rm-playing agents in N(i). It must be noticed
that the propagated decision concerns a specific pair of role playing agents and
both, a period and a subjective correspondence for this period. Such a decision
is of the form (i:k, x:m, 〈P,X〉), where x ∈ N(i) and decision(i:k, ·:m) = P .
Agents propagate their decisions to their neighbors in the network iteratively
and in a cooperative manner, aiming to exploit the transitive closure of corre-
spondences in cyclic paths. This is similar to the technique reported in [9]. Agents
propagate what we call c− histories, which are ordered lists of decisions made
by agents along the paths in the network. Each propagated decision heads such
a history. For instance the c-history propagated by i to any Rm-playing agent x,
as far as the role Rk is concerned, is [(i:k, x : m, 〈P,X〉)|L], where L is either an
empty c-history or the c-history that has been propagated to i, concerning its
role Rk. By propagating c-histories, agents can detect cycles and take advantage
of the transitivity of correspondences, detecting positive/negative feedback to
their decisions.
Specifically, an agent i detects a cycle by inspecting in a received c-history
the most recent item (i:k, x : m, 〈P,X〉) originated by itself: Given a cycle (1→
2 → ...(n − 1) → 1), then for each decision (1:k, 2:m, 〈P,X〉) for the roles Rk
and Rm that agents 1, 2 play, respectively, heading a c-history from 1 to 2, the
originator must get a decision (n-1:m, 1:k, 〈P,X〉) from the last agent (n− 1) in
the cycle, if it plays the role Rm. Thus, the agent 1 must receive a decision from
9(n− 1) concerning P , rather than to any other period, and the correspondence
〈P,X〉. In such a case the agent 1 counts a positive feedback. In case there is a
cycle but the forwarded decision does not concern P , then there are one or more
correspondences or decisions through the path that result to disagreements. In
this case, the agent 1 counts a negative feedback for its decision. It must be
noticed that disagreements may still exist when the agent 1 gets the expected
choice but several decisions along the path compensate ”errors”. These cases
are detected by the other agents, as the c-history propagates in the network.
To make the computations more efficient and in order to synchronize agents’
decision making we consider that c-histories can be propagated up to 3 hops
with repetitions: This means that given two neighbors i and j, any c-history
starting from i (1st hop) shall be returned to this agent with the decision of j
(2nd hop), and will return later to j with the new decision of i (3rd hop). In
the last hop the agent i will choose a strategy by considering also the feedback
received from j, in conjunction with feedback from any other neighbor.
But how actually do agents compute decisions in their social context w.r.t.
their preferences and constraints? Notice that decisions concern specific periods
w.r.t. subjective correspondences. From now on, when we say decisions we mean
exactly this combination: Thus when agents revise their decisions they may revise
their subjective correspondences, or their strategies for scheduling tasks, or both.
Reinforcement learning and the emergence of norms: Given that agents
do not have prior knowledge about the effects of decisions made, this informa-
tion has to be learned based on the rewards received (including feedback from
others). Using the model of collaborative multiagent MDP framework [10], [11]
we assume:
-The society of agents S = (R, A,E).
-A time step t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ...
-A set of discrete state variables per agent-role i:k at time t, denoted by st(i:k),(·:m),
where i ∈ A and Rm ∈ SocialContext(i). The state variable ranges to the set of
possible correspondences between periods in PRk and periods in PRm . The local
state sti of agent i at time t is the tuple of the state variables for all roles played
by i in combination with any role in its social context. A global state st at time
t is the tuple of all agents’ local states. The set State is the set of global states.
-A strategy for every agent-role i:k and role Rm ∈ SocialContext(i) at time t,
denoted by ct(i:k),(·:m) = decision(i:k, ·:m). The local strategy for every agent i,
denoted by cti is a tuple of strategies, each for any role that i plays in combina-
tion with any other role in its social context. The joint strategy of a subset T of
A×R (for instance of agents in N(i) playing their roles in SocialContext(i)), is
a tuple of local strategies, one for each agent playing a role in that set, denoted
by ctT (e.g. c
t
N(i)). The joint strategy for all agents A at time t is denoted c
t,
while the set of all joint strategies for A is the set Strategy.
-A state transition function T : State×Strategy×State→ [0, 1] gives the tran-
sition probability p(st+1|st, ct), based on the joint strategy ct taken in state st.
-A reward function per agent-role i:k given its decisions concerning role Rm ∈
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SocialContext(i), denoted by Rwd(i:k),(·:m), where i ∈ A and Rk a role played
by agent i. The reward function per agent-role i:k, denoted by Rwd(i:k) provides
the agent i:k with an individual reward based on the joint decision of its neigh-
borhood, taken in its local state. The local reward of an agent i, Rwdi, is the
sum of its rewards for all the roles it plays.
It must be noticed that states represent agents’ assumptions about periods’
correspondences, while agents’ strategies concern the specific periods for schedul-
ing role-specific tasks. The reward function concerns decisions made by agents,
i.e. agents’ strategies w.r.t. their states, and depends on the utility of agents’
choices while playing specific roles, on the feedback received from neighbors, and
on the payoff received after performing the scheduled tasks:
Rwd(i:k)(P, si) = a ∗ U(i:k, P ) + b ∗ Feedback(i:k, si) + Payoff(i:k, ci), where
Feedback(i:k, si) = Payoff ∗ Feedback+(i:k, si) + Penalty ∗ Feedback−(i:k, si),
P ∈ PRi , and Feedback+(i:k, si), Feedback−(i:k, si) are the numbers of posi-
tive and negative feedbacks received, respectively, Payoff and Penalty are the
numbers specifying the payoff and cost for each positive and negative feedback,
respectively (being equal to the corresponding utility parameters). The param-
eters a and b have been used for balancing between own utility and feedback
received by others: As previous works have shown [9], the role of both is crucial.
The method is tolerant to different values of these parameters, but here we con-
sider that ab =
1
10 . Finally, Payoff(i:k, ci) is the payoff that the agent i receives
after performing Rk tasks by applying the strategies chosen.
A (local) policy of an agent i in its social context is a function pii : si → ci
that returns a local decision for any given local state. The objective for any
agent in the society is to find an optimal policy pi∗ that maximizes the expected
discounted future return V ∗i (s) = maxpiiE[
∞∑
t=0
δtRwdi(pii(s
t
i), s
t
i)|pii)] for each
state si, while playing all its roles. The expectation E(.) averages over stochastic
transitions, and δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor.
This model assumes the Markov property, assuming also that rewards and
transition probabilities are independent of time. Thus, the state next to state s
is denoted by s′ and it is independent of time.
Q−functions, or action-value functions, represent the future discounted re-
ward for a state s when making the choice c and behaving optimally from then
on. The optimal policy for the agents in state s is to jointly make the choice
argmaxcQ
∗(s, c) that maximizes the expected future discounted reward. The
next paragraphs describe two distributed variants of Q-learning considering that
agents do not know the transition and reward model (model-free methods) and
interact with their neighbors, only. Both variants assume that agents propagate
their decisions to neighbors, and take advantage of dependencies with others,
specified by means of the edges connecting them in the society.
Independent Reinforcement Learners: In the first variant, the local function Qi
for an agent i is defined as a linear combination of all contributions from its
social context, for any role Rk played by i in combination with roles Rm in its
11
social context: Qi =
∑
Rk
∑
j:m,j∈N(i)
Q(i:k),(j:m). To simplify the formulae we denote
((i:k), (j:m)) by i ./ j. Thus, each Qi./j is updated as follows:
Qi./j(si, ci./j) = Qi./j(si, ci./j) +
α[Rwdi:k(si, ci./j) + δmaxc′i./jQi./j(s
′
i, ci./j)−Qi./j(si, ci./j))]
This method is in contrast to the Coordinated Reinforcement Learning model
proposed by Guestrin in [12] that considers society’s global state, and it is closer
to the model of independent learners, since the formula considers the local states
of agents.
Collaborative Reinforcement Learners: The second variant is the agent-based
update sparse cooperative edge-based Q-learning method proposed in [13]. Given
two neighbor agents i:k and j:m, theQ−function is denotedQi:k,j:m(si:k,j:m, ci:k,j:m, cj:m,i:k),
or succinctly Qi./j(si./j , ci./j , cj./i), where si./j are the state variables related to
the two agents playing their roles, and ci./j , cj./i are the strategies chosen by the
two agents. The sum of all these edge-specific Q−functions defines the global
Q−function. It must be noticed that it may hold that i = j, considering the
Q−functions for the different roles the agent i is playing. The update function
is as follows:
Qi./j(si./j , ci./j , cj./i)) = Qi./j(si./j , ci./j , cj./i)) +
α
∑
x:y∈{i:k,j:m}
Rwdx:y(sx:y,cx:y)+δQ
∗
x:y(s
′
x:y,cx:y)−Qx:y(sx:y,cx:y)
|N(x)|
The local function of an agent i:k is defined to be the summation of half the
value of all local functions Qi./j(si./j , ci./j , cj./i) for any j:m, with j ∈ N(i) and
Rm ∈ SocialContext(i): Qi:k(si:k, ci:k) = 12
∑
j:m
Qi./j(si./j , ci./j , cj./i). Closing this
Fig. 1. Isolated agents playing the role Rk.
section we need to answer whether agents in any society do learn social norms
via agreements in their social context: The answer is negative in case there are
socially-isolated agents playing the same role. These are agents whose social
context is limited to a single role. Thus, they do not interact ”heavily” with
the society and are somehow isolated in the neighborhoods of others. These are
for instance the agents a and b in Figure 1: They interact only with the agents
i:m and j:m. Although i:m and j:m may reach agreements on their role-specific
strategies via the path(s) connecting them, and each one of them may reach
agreements with a:k and b:k in their social contexts, respectively, there may not
be an agreement between a and b, and thus a norm may not emerge for Rm-
playing agents. Nevertheless, these agents do have separate concerns and have
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reached agreements in their contexts. Such cases do not exist in the experimental
cases considered in the section that follows.
5 Experimental Results
We have performed simulations using the two social learning methods proposed
in two types of networks: Small-world networks that have been constructed using
the Watts-Strogatz model (W) [14], and scale-free networks constructed using
the Albert -Baraba´si (B) model [15]. For both types of networks we have experi-
mented with different populations of agents, and with various degrees of agents’
connectivity. For these types of networks, we have run experiments with popula-
tions of 10,20,50,100 and 200 agents, and with and average number of neighbors
(ANN) 4,10,16,20. Each case is denoted by X |N | ANN , (e.g. B 100 10) where
X the network construction model. This article reports on results with B net-
works with different |N | and ANN=4, on results with B networks with |N | = 100
and different ANNs, and finally on W0.5 networks with |N | = 100 and different
ANNs.
The society roles R are 4, R = {fmember, worker, dependent, boss} and
each agent can play up to 2 roles satisfying the following constraints: Any
worker can be an fmember and vise-versa, a dependent can not play any
other role, while a boss cannot play other roles and is connected to agents play-
ing the role of worker. The dependents are up to 10% of the population. Us-
ing these constraints, roles are assigned to agents randomly. The incompatible
pairs of roles are (fmember, worker), (fmember, boss), (dependent, worker),
(dependent, boss). Thus, any agent connected to an fmember and a boss, for
instance, can not schedule tasks for these two roles during the same period.
We do provide results when all agents are Independent Reinforcement-Learners
(IRL) or Collaborative Reinforcement-Learners (CRL). In both methods the
payoff Payoff for positive feedback and satisfaction of constraints is equal to
3, while the penalty Penalty is equal to -5. Considering the reward, as already
said, the ratio between the utility factor a and the feedback factor b is 1:10. For
each role there are two distinct periods: The preferred (p) and the non preferred
(np). These are denoted by the initial role of the role and a subscript p or np.
For instance wp is the workers preferred period. The joint task that agents need
to perform is scheduling their meetings. The payoff matrices for role-specific
strategies are given below.
bp bnp
wp -1,-1 3,2
wnp 2,3 -1,-1
mp mnp
wp 2,3 -1,-1
wnp -1,-1 3,2
dp dnp
wp 3,3 -1,-1
wnp -1,-1 3,3
dp dnp
mp 3,3 -1,-1
mnp -1,-1 3,3
It must be noticed that agents play different types of games while interacting
with other roles, and do not exploit the payoffs of others in their neighborhood.
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Both learning methods use an exploration function, counting the number of
times each correspondence or strategy has been used. An epoch comprises an
exploration followed by a pure exploitation period, while the number of times
that correspondences and strategies are to be tried increases by a constant in
each epoch.
Figure 2 shows the results of both methods for different types of networks
and different percentages of converging agents (T): The first (second) column
reports on methods convergence when T = 100% (respectively, when T = 90%).
It must be noticed that results concerning state of the art methods require that
T ≤ 90%. The convergence rule is that the required percentage of agents has
reached agreement without violating any constraint in 10 subsequent rounds
during an exploitation period. Each point in any line is the average total payoff
in 5 independent runs per case received by the agents at the end of an epoch. The
reported results concern 9 epochs (1000 rounds), aiming to show the efficacy of
the proposed methods. A line in Figure 2 stops at an epoch (notice that in some
cases the X-axis has less than 9 points), when the corresponding method has
converged in all independent runs for the corresponding case until this epoch.
The average convergence round per case and method are reported in Figure
3. The value 1000 means that the corresponding method has not managed to
converge until epoch 9 (the 1000th round).
Experimentation results show that both methods are very effective both in
agents convergence rate (i.e. percentage of agents reaching agreement) and in
the number of epochs required. All cases converge, and in case we require 90%
convergence, agents using any of the methods managed to converge to agreements
in fewer than 9 epochs, except in networks with low ANN. Specifically, regarding
the B networks with different populations (first two rows), as it is expected, the
convergence is slower as the population increases. For networks of 100 agents,
with a varying ANN, IRL converges faster for networks with higher ANN, while
CRL is not affected by the degree of agents connectivity, although it converges
slower than IRL in most cases when T = 90%. For W networks, both methods
converge less effectively. However, CRL manages to convergence more effectively
when 90% convergence is required, although this is not always the case: We can
observe that in networks with a large population of agents and with high ANN,
IRL can be more efficient. This is reported in all cases (especially for T = 90%)
for B networks, but not for W networks.
6 Related work
Early approaches towards learning norms either involve two agents iteratively
playing a stage game towards reaching a preferred equilibrium, or models where
the reward of each individual agent depends on the joint action of all the other
agents in the population. Other approaches consider that agents learn by itera-
tively interacting with a single opponent from the population [4], also considering
14100% convergence 90% convergence
CRL, B, |N | ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100, 200}
IRL, B, |N | ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100, 200}
CRL,B,|N | = 100, ACD ∈ {4, 10, 16, 20}
IRL,B,|N | = 100, ACD ∈ {4, 10, 16, 20}
CRL,W,|N | = 100, ACD ∈ {4, 10, 16, 20}
IRL,W,|N | = 100, ACD ∈ {4, 10, 16, 20}
X axis: Epoch number, Y axis: Total payoff
Fig. 2. Experimental results.
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Fig. 3. Average convergence round per case.
the distance between agents [3]. In contrast to this, in [5] the communication
between agents is physically constrained and agents interact and learn with all
their neighbors. In these works agents learn rules of the road by playing a single
role at each time step. We rather consider more realistic cases where agents do
not share knowledge of their environment, they play multiple roles and interact
with all their neighbors who also play multiple and maybe incompatible roles
simultaneously. Finally, agents have role-specific preferences on their strategies.
Concerning the learning methods that have been used, Shoham and Tennen-
holtz [8] proposed a reinforcement learning approach using the Highest Cumu-
lative Reward rule. However this rule depends on the memory size of agents,
as far as the history of agents’ past strategy choices is concerned. The effects
of memory and history of agents’ past actions have also been considered in the
work reported by Villatoro et al [16], [17],. Sen et al [4] studied the effectiveness
of reinforcement methods also considering the influence of the population size,
of the possible actions, the existence of different types of learners in the popu-
lation, as well as the underlying network topology of agents [18]. In [5] authors
have proposed a learning method where each agent, at each time step interacts
with all its neighbors simultaneously and use ensemble learning methods to com-
pute a final strategy. In all experiments reported in the above mentioned studies
Q-learners are more effective than other learners. In this work we propose two
social learning Q-learning methods, according to which agents interact with all
of their neighbors, considering all the roles in their social context. Agents com-
pute role-specific strategies, while for a single role the decisions taken depends
on the feedback received from others, the existing constraints and role-specific
preferences.
7 Conclusions and further work
This article proposes two social, distributed reinforcement learning methods for
agents to compute conventions concerning the use of common resources to per-
form joint tasks. This happens via reaching agreements in their social context
and in conjunction to computing semantic agreements on the representation of
resources. To a greater extent than other models, agents play multiple roles in
their social contexts, even with incompatible requirements and preferences. Re-
sults show that the proposed methods are efficient, despite the complexity of the
problem considered. Further work concerns investigating (a) the effectiveness
of hierarchical reinforcement learning techniques [19] for computing hierarchical
policies (for correspondences, scheduling strategies and joined tasks); (b) the
tolerance of the methods to different payoffs of performing joined tasks, as well
16
as to different exploration-exploitation schemes, and (c) societies with different
types of learners.
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